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	 	 AbstrACt
The idea of a Basic Income Grant (BIG) has for long been 
an appealing alternative to the means-tested social security nets as-
sociated with the welfare state as we know it. Proponents of BIG high-
light as comparative advantages its unconditionality, its inclusiveness 
and its administrative simplicity. Moreover, as capital-intensive invest-
ment and demographic evolutions engender a decline in activity rates, 
social security nets that rely on labour as both a source of financing 
and a condition for entry seem more and more untenable. These latter 
systems have however for long been in place and have a firm historical 
embeddedness. Hence, the introduction of BIG requires a revolution-
ary momentum.
South Africa has gone through a period of profound soci-
etal change over the last two decades. After decades of racial exclusion, 
post-apartheid opened the pursuit of a progressive social inclusionary 
politics. South Africa has been one of the few countries where social 
security expenditure has been steadily on the rise since the second half 
of the 1990s. The ANC-government has opted to strengthen several 
targeted grants (pensions, child grant, etc.), leaving the searing unem-
ployed active population uncovered.
This article contends that the introduction of a modest 
BIG, alongside the pre-existing grant system is a feasible and prom-
ising option as it would have a considerable beneficial effect on pov-
erty without entailing large costs. This position is shared among an 
impressive coalition of civil society organisations and political parties. 
The article inquires why the ANC, in these conditions, shuns away from 
the introduction of BIG. We conclude that, how ripe South Africa may 
be for BIG, the ANC-ideology pushes government to strengthen the 
workfare-approach, including employment programmes, over a radi-
cal overhaul of the social security system.
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	 	 résumé
L'idée d'un revenu de base inconditionnel et généralisé a 
depuis longtemps été chérie en alternative aux systèmes de sécurité 
sociale introduits dans l'État-providence. Ses avocats mettent l'accent 
sur sa simplicité, son inconditionnalité et son caractère englobant sub-
séquent. Maintenant que des technologies à faible intensité de main-
d'oeuvre font fureur, combinées à des évolutions démographiques me-
nacent de mettre les systèmes de sécurité sociale en crise, le travail ne 
peut plus servir comme base de financement et condition d'entrée à 
ces systèmes. Cependant, fortement ancrés qu'ils sont dans l'histoire 
des états-providence, leur remplacement par un revenu de base né-
cessite une révolution sociale.
L'Afrique du Sud a été secouée par la transition de l'Apar-
theid à un État social et progressiste au cours des deux dernières dé-
cennies. Elle a été parmi ces rares pays où les dépenses sociales ont 
augmenté de manière structurelle depuis la deuxième moitié des an-
nées 1990. Le gouvernement ANC a misé sur le renforcement de sub-
ventions destinées à des groupes spécifiques (jeunes, handicapés, etc.), 
laissant pour autant la vaste population de chômeurs sans support.
L'article présent prétend que l'introduction en Afrique du Sud 
d'un revenu de base modique, complémentant les autres formes de 
support garanti, serait une option faisable et efficace dans la lutte 
contre la pauvreté qui, pour autant, ne devrait pas engendrer de 
grands frais. Cette opinion, comme nous l'exposons, est largement 
répandue parmi la société civile et des partis politiques. L'article 
enquiert pourquoi l'ANC dans de telles conditions s'oppose à l'intro-
duction du revenu de base. Nous concluons que, nonobstant les 
bénéfices qui en découleraient, l'ANC préfère à cette dernière option, 
qui nécessiterait une transformation fondamentale, des interventions 
dans le marché du travail (ce qui correspond à son idéologie de base) 
et le renforcement du système en place.	IOB Discussion Paper 2007-03 • 7 South Africa’s BIG debate in comparative perspective
The end of human action, as distinct from the end products of fabri-
cation, can never be reliably predicted.  The means used to achieve 
political goals are more often than not of greater relevance to the 
future world than the intended goals.
                    H.Arendt , On violence, 1970
	 1.	 IntroduCtIon 
The South African transition to democracy after decades 
of apartheid and anti-systemic struggle, is generally understood by 
South Africans as a revolution. Although negotiations between the 
Ancien Régime and the opposition movement have played a major role, 
this  perception  seems  well-conceived  and  provides  for  interesting 
analytical approaches. Writing “On Revolution”, Hannah Arendt expli-
cates two adverse momenta. On the one hand, a revolution liberates 
tremendous possibilities by breaking down a pre-existing social order. 
Simultaneously, a revolution constitutes a foundational moment, in 
that the scattered social order allows the ascendance of new politi-
cal power brokers. The new powerholders stabilise their position by 
bringing the liberatory momentum to a close – stated differently, the 
revolutionary upheaval is traded for the foundation of new social ar-
rangements that come to be seen as the fixed outcome, the results of 
the revolutionary momentum (Arendt, 1961).
The South African National Democratic Revolution (NDR) 
as it is termed in political debate, is no exception to this rule. The end 
of the Apartheid era freed enthusiastic aspirations that had been fed 
throughout decades of struggle and anti-apartheid ideologies. The 
promise of a new and just future, of a democratic society seemed within 
reach as the hegemonic anti-apartheid movement came to power. In-
deed, to the ANC fell the task of devising social structures that would 
underpin the realisation of its egalitarian promises of a political and 
social democracy.
The debates on reparation, undoing the injustices of the 
past and overcoming the huge disparities in wealth that have been in-
herited from the apartheid era have unavoidably gained centrality in 
this pursuit. Whereas a social security net was in place for a minority 
of the South African population, the ANC faced the task of extending 
social justice to all. The revolutionary momentum allowed to envisage 
a wide range of options. Among the options that have been taken seri-
ously was the idea of a Basic Income Grant, an option that, as we will 
see, still stirs the heart of many.
In what follows, we attempt to disentangle the debate 
that has surrounded this option. We will look at the South African 
context in which this debate is waged, by analysing the current social 
security system and the political views that surround it. Furthermore 
we assess the feasibility of a BIG, both by looking at the pros and cons  • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-03 South Africa’s BIG debate in comparative perspective
that have been raised internationally in learned debate, and by further 
analysing the specificities of the South African situation. In order to 
grasp the appeal the Basic Income Grant has incited, we will turn to 
the historical roots of this option, before looking closer at the advan-
tages that are ascribed to it.
	 2.	 the	bIG	debAte	In	InternAtIonAl	perspeCtIve
   2.1.  Historical Roots and context of BIG
The Basic Income Grant  (BIG) idea and its variants, have 
deep historical roots and featured prominently as radical ideas to tack-
le societal problems linked to the disembedding of society by capital-
ism1. People were set free from the oppressive feudal links but by the 
same token were separated from land and the means of production. 
They were left with only their labour power to sell and like any other 
commodity, its price and quantity depended on the impersonal laws of 
the market. Unemployment, inequality  and poverty were inseparable 
from increasing production and wealth since capitalism, driven by the  
“locomotive of competition”, threw out the weak and less productive 
producers and “rewarded”, through higher profits, the stronger ones. 
This process of “creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 1935) gave rise to 
opposing tendencies, social movements and ideas.
The traditional distinction between scientific and utopian 
socialists made by Marxist authors, points at two different answers 
and practices for opposing the brutality of capitalism in the first half 
of the 19th century. By the end of the century however , the utopian 
movement lost ground, giving way to a more evolutionary “social de-
mocracy” solution. Although heavily criticized by Marx (Critique of 
the Programme of Gotha, 1894), social democracy (and its variants) 
transformed the brutality of capitalism and combined its strength of 
“creative destruction” with increasing rights, wages and social security 
for the labour class. At the same time “real existing socialism”  was 
established with  the Bolshevik revolution in Russia and the other 
communist parties' rise to power in other countries after the second 
world war. These experiences came to an end first of all with the fall of 
the Berlin wall and the end of the cold war that  dominated the “short 
twentieth  century”  (E.Hobsbawm,  1995).  Secondly,  the  successful 
capitalist breakthrough of China under the aegis of a communist party 
meant de facto that socialism, as a radically different way of  taming 
the erratic market forces was abandoned. 
The Global market was embraced as an opportunity for 
upward mobility in the world system by the strong worldwide play-
1 One of the very first proposals on basic income 
or endowment can be found in the  work of Tho-
mas Paine,  The Rights of Man (1791-1792) and 
in Agrarian Justice (1795) (King, J.E. & Marangos 
J 2006).  Half a century later during the labour un-
rest and revolts of 1848 , basic income proposals 
inspired by the “utopian socialist” Fourier, were 
used  as  incriminating  evidence  for  the  Belgian 
justice courts against the authors (G.Erreygers & 
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ers such as the multinationals but also by the newly emerging market 
economies such as China and India. This led to decreasing numbers 
of poor in these latter countries but rising inequalities in the former. 
However, if these emerging economies are transforming the world sys-
tem and the balance of power in the 21st century they equally create 
new contradictions on a worldwide scale that go hand in hand with the 
embrace of worldwide market forces.
In the old  “developed” world , the  protective shield of 
social security systems comes under stress since these countries can 
only compete internationally with new capital and technology inten-
sive techniques driving out the low-skilled and the vulnerable groups 
from the labour market. The social and financial costs are passed on to 
the state budget whereas the benefits are privatized, thereby putting 
the welfare state and the national solution to market failures (in the 
form of an expanding state budget for social outlays) under severe 
stress. The problem of  the  welfare state in the globalization era  is 
compounded by the demographic evolution in these “old” countries 
were the population ratio of non-active persons increases dramati-
cally . The cost of this aging society is borne by a decreasing number of 
active persons. 
The  middle  and  low  income  countries  ,  with  fewer  op-
portunities in the global competition drive and a weak national social 
security shield,  experienced higher degrees of exclusion and poverty. 
(http://www.gapminder.org/). As we shall see later in this article , there 
are however very diverse national responses to the inequalities cre-
ated by the  globalization drive. In the lowest income countries such 
as the DRCongo, Sudan  and other Sub Saharan African countries  with 
the highest rates of poverty, because of their unsuccessful national 
economic development, formal wages are dismally low and cover only 
a small percentage of the labour force. In the DRC e.g. only five % of 
the active population has a formal wage and has some sort of social 
assistance. The overwhelming majority of the population have no ac-
cess to formal wages nor to any sort of social security organized by 
the state. They have to rely on their coping strategies of survival in 
the informal sector and on churches and the like  for their health and 
education needs  (De Herdt & Marysse, 1997; Marysse,2003). On the 
contrary Middle Income Countries such as South Africa, Brazil, Mexico 
, India have already more or less sophisticated systems of social assist-
ance or public work programs for alleviating poverty but are still very 
far from a sufficient coverage for the poor population at large (Seek-
ings, 2006).
The essential new contradiction in the beginning of the 
21st century is that the global market forces are not matched by equal-
ly automatic protective measures and that the national answers of so-
cial security are insufficient to the challenges of  globalization.10 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-03 South Africa’s BIG debate in comparative perspective
In a strange reversal of fortune, the so despised utopian 
socialist ideas , re-emerge  at the end of the twentieth century under 
the form of  BIG with possibly new elements in the fight for interna-
tional social justice endangered by the challenges of globalization. 
The most eloquent title that suggest these pretensions is 
without any doubt the article by Van Parijs and Van Veen (1986) “A 
capitalist road to communism”, where they explain and defend the 
idea that a basic income is the cornerstone of social justice and the 
realm of “real freedom” in a world dominated by capitalism.  A Trojan 
horse so to speak, that transforms the inherent tendency of capitalist 
development, its necessary reduction of labor time per unit of produc-
tion,  into freedom for all instead of poverty for the many . Theoreti-
cally this dream is feasible if you link it with the ideas of a Tobin tax on 
a world scale. But between dream and reality, a long road of discussion 
, implementation and practical difficulties stand in the way. The fol-
lowing two are some of the most prominent problems:
·  The low income countries have no financial basis or 
lack political willingness to  introduce some form of basic social assist-
ance. In these cases some form of an automatic (Tobin)  tax levied on 
international financial transactions could be very helpful to alleviate 
some of the severest forms of poverty and avoid the pitfalls of condi-
tional Aid flows.
·  The very unequal incomes between countries that do 
not permit  a world basic income even if in theory it would be feasible 
to finance it. Indeed  the necessity to  modulate the basic income per 
country to avoid poverty and employment traps needs to position the 
struggle for basic income first at each national level..
 Convincing academia and other important fora of these 
ideas and the necessity of introduction of a BIG  is exactly the endeav-
our of an international group of academics and practitioners organized 
in BIEN (Basic Income Earth Network) (www.basicincome.org) .  Exactly 
the relative merits and problems at the national level of the introduc-
tion of a BIG is still an ongoing debate in almost every country. 
   2.2.  BIG pretensions 
Intellectual fads and fashions have often a short durabil-
ity. This is certainly not the case with the Basic Income . Indeed when 
analyzing the publications of the driving forces of BIEN, academics like 
Philippe Van Parijs, Robert Van Veen, Guy Standing and many others 
have developed and  fine-tuned their ideas , but the main arguments 
are repeated from the very first writings since the revival of the BIG 
idea to this very day (Van Parys, 1985 -2006) Not only do they go back 
to a long intellectual tradition but the evolution of reality has in fact 
reinforced the strength of their ideas mainly for two reasons. 
First the end of the cold war has discredited the preten-IOB Discussion Paper 2007-03 • 11 South Africa’s BIG debate in comparative perspective
sions of a planned economy that could guarantee full employment 
and at the same time increase living standards and freedom. The con-
comitant triumph of socially corrected market economies in a context 
of globalization reveals however another fundamental weakness: the 
incapacity to guarantee full employment and fight poverty efficiently 
within the context of globalization.  This section will outlay the argu-
ments of the BIG supporters on the thesis of  a BIG as the cornerstone 
of a more efficient functioning labour market, less poverty and more 
freedom.               
The Basic Income Earth Network defines a Basic Income as follows:
“A basic income is an income unconditionally granted to all on an indi-
vidual basis, without means test or work requirement. It is a form of 
minimum income guarantee that differs from those that now exist in 
various European countries in three important ways: it is being paid 
to individuals rather than households; it is paid irrespective of any 
income from other sources; it is paid without requiring the perform-
ance of any work or the willingness to accept a job if offered.”
(www.basicincome.org)
The merits of the introduction of a BIG would do surprisingly much in 
the words of BIEN:
“Liberty and equality, efficiency and community, common ownership 
of the Earth and equal sharing in the benefits of technical progress, 
the flexibility of the labour market and the dignity of the poor, the 
fight against inhumane working conditions, against the desertifica-
tion of the countryside and against interregional inequalities, the vi-
ability of cooperatives and the promotion of adult education, auton-
omy from bosses, husbands and bureaucrats, have all been invoked 
in its favour.”
This definition is at first sight quite surprising and a lot of 
questions arise immediately. Why should rich and poor be entitled to a 
basic income.? Why should the disabled , sick and old  receive the same 
as the young and healthy? Giving an entitlement/right on income with-
out a concomitant duty towards society, isn’t that going to increase de-
pendence and passive receiving citizens without an active involvement 
, depriving them from real citizenship defined as a bundle of rights and 
duties? At first sight , the existing systems of social assistance based 
on a means test delivering income support for those who really need 
it seems so much more realistic in terms of financial feasibility for the 
state budget  and much more justified in terms of social justice. How 
could a proposal as basic income to all citizens then be more effective 
in terms of employment creation and poverty alleviation and yet be 
financially feasible? To understand this paradox the following graphs 
are the clearest way for understanding the apparent paradox of a BIG. 
(Van Parijs, 2006)12 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-03 South Africa’s BIG debate in comparative perspective




Both graphs have a 45° line where  gross income earned 
would be exactly the same as net income , meaning that the state 
would not levy taxes. The bold lines depict the evolution of net income 
after taxes and under different social assistance policy.  In graph one 
the most common policy in most developed (non Anglo-Saxon) coun-
tries is one of means tested minimum income guarantee for those fall-
ing below a certain predetermined income G because of ill fortune , un-
employment,  old age, health problems, handicap etc. Most of the time 
this minimum income level is adjusted or complemented for special 
categories such as  the disabled , the sick ,old age pensions and other 
categories who often have exceptional expenses . Under that system 
, you have no incentive to work for a wage or earn an income that is 
lower than G since the state will then lower your income assistance by 
that amount. In other words , and this a key argument for the introduc-
tion of BIG,  all work that is fetching a salary or an income that is lower 
than the minimum will not be offered on the market. This can be very 
low- skilled work (a reason why you do not find low skilled local work-
ers in most of the developed countries) but it might as well be very 
skilled work such as art painting , or music playing in a band or caring 
for the sick , poor and other persons in need. Every effort that is paid 
is taxed at a 100% tax rate and therefore the means tested minimum 
income policy, creates an employment trap. 
In graph 2 with the introduction of a BIG , the employ-
ment trap would be avoided, since everybody is entitled to G and every 
income earned by part-time work , or whatever paid activity would add 
to the net income , even if everybody has to pay taxes on the addi-
tional income. In this graph , we suppose a flat tax rate , but the same 
argument holds for progressive taxation scales.  Not only would the 
employment trap be avoided but active participation in low paid jobs 
, low skilled or highly valued but badly paid,  would be stimulated and 
poverty less prevalent. The BIG introduction would thus hit two birds 
with one stone. Once the line of net income crosses the 45° line and 
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pay as much to the state as you receive in terms of a BIG. From that 
level B onwards, the higher income brackets pay net taxes.
The main merits of the introduction of a BIG are first a 
higher income for the poorer sections of the population without the 
stigma attached to the status of assisted persons, such as sponging 
or laziness, since everyone benefits equally from the BIG. Second the 
avoidance of the employment trap , mobilizes labour that would oth-
erwise not be offered on the labour market , thereby increasing em-
ployment for the poor and increasing freedom to choose “the life one 
values” (Sen ,1999) by those who offer valuable but not necessarily 
full time marketable labour. Other merits are certainly that BIG avoids 
the cumbersome and elaborate process of means testing for those 
who are entitled to a minimum income. The advocates of BIG insist 
further on the less paternalistic features of BIG and on its simpler de-
livery, thereby reducing costs. 
   2.3.  BIG pretensions … and small realizations?
However , if BIG was so superior to the existing systems 
, how come that so few  existing means tested social assistance sys-
tems have been replaced by the introduction of BIG? There are many 
reasons that can be invoked and marginal comments to make to this 
perception .
The reality of social security systems is often a complex 
social construct that has taken shape as a consequence of a histori-
cal conjecture made by a large diversity of actors and within a certain 
time frame. Most of the elaborate western European social security 
systems have been edified as one of the cornerstones of the welfare 
state, constructed in the aftermath of the great slump of the thirties 
and the ensuing world war II. Full employment was its prime objec-
tive and social security had to act as a built-in stabilizer for national  
economic stabilization and a safeguard against poverty at the level 
of the households. There were many variations and regulations with 
different mixes of state, private and semi-public instances organizing 
this edifice. However, they all had in common a certain state interven-
tion in the five areas  where people,  whatever their condition, should 
be shouldered (child support, unemployment risks, old age support, 
handicap, health hazards). In some of these five areas of social secu-
rity and most prominently in the domain of children support, we see 
that there were elements of basic Income long before BIG was an is-
sue. Universal non-conditional child support grants were in many de-
veloped countries part and parcel of  these social security systems and 
thus there were elements of BIG in parts of the existing systems.1 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-03 South Africa’s BIG debate in comparative perspective
As a consequence of the complexity of existing social secu-
rity systems they obey to the laws of what the new institutional school 
has termed: path dependency. (North, 1990) All institutions are an in-
terplay of many historical and contextual conjectures .Once deeply en-
grained in society they cannot easily be replaced  without considerable 
“transaction costs” because of vested interests , beliefs and norms. 
Profound institutional changes need very special historical conditions 
such as wars, revolution or deep crisis. So in normal times, institutions 
will tend to change or reform at the margin, because they are afraid 
of unknown big changes that are unpredictable in their consequences. 
Probably , this is also what the reform/expansion of social assistance 
is all about in SA. The 2007 reform consists mainly in increasing the 
Child Support Grant (CSG) to R 190 per month  and expanding  the age 
of eligibility from 7 to 14 years (M&G, feb 2007), . President Mbeki 
goes against the plea for a BIG by COSATU but follows the less radical 
but more prudent advice by  the Taylor commission (2002) and espe-
cially by EPRI (2004)study. The latter study  shows convincingly that 
an expansion of the  CSG is the most effective in terms of poverty al-
leviation (for the political discussion see section 3.1. ). 
Another serious objection to the introduction of a BIG as 
an effective way to fight poverty is the multifaceted  character of pov-
erty. Income poverty may be the most important reason of poverty , 
but often poverty is the outcome of many other deprivations that the 
poor can experience. The place , the time , the lack of a stable caring 
family background, the absence of schools, water , electricity etc; are 
all impediments to acquire the necessary “capabilities” to break the 
vicious circle of poverty . Income support is certainly a necessary con-
dition but not sufficient . Schools , access to water electricity , health 
services , etc. are necessary complementary investments the state has 
to finance besides an income support . And even then, these invest-
ments will only effectively eradicate poverty if they are accompanied 
by decently paid, but before all committed and dedicated schoolmas-
ters, civil servants, nurses, doctors etc.. 
A slightly different but related objection is the “one size 
fits all” argument. How could one amount of BIG be sufficient to cater 
for such diverse needs as a handicap , special health care needs, old 
age problems, unemployment in short for the different hazards in life? 
A disabled person’s needs are certainly more complex than a young un-
employed adult. Again a BIG is surely not a small contribution to help 
in case of realization of these hazards, but in a careful society, more is 
needed in terms of state finance and dedication of persons to cater for 
these diverse needs. In sum , instead of a “Simple and Powerful Idea 
for the 21st century” (Van Parijs, 2006) much  more will be needed to 
fight poverty adding to the many priorities that  governments are urged IOB Discussion Paper 2007-03 • 1 South Africa’s BIG debate in comparative perspective
to finance . Poverty and  insecurity are complex outcomes of complex 
societies that are not directly transparent. But may be the point is not 
that BIG supporters do not recognize the diversity of needs , their point 
is that BIG would be superior to existing sytems of social security.
Some of the above objections can certainly partly be coun-
tered by BIG supporters . There is a certain evolution in their thoughts  
in the sense that they will now acquiesce for the need to supplement 
BIG with other state interventions and advocate the introduction of 
BIG without eliminating necessarily existing social security interven-
tions.( Van Parijs, 2006 and www.basicincome.org). In an interesting 
detailed and documented simulation on the conditions of the intro-
duction of a BIG in the USA,  I.Garfunkel et allii.(2006) come to the 
conclusion that the introduction of a BIG , partly substituting certain 
pre-existing social grants,  would have desirable redistribution effects 
in that it lowers  poverty and decreases inequality but also that 
“because other welfare state programs and other government func-
tions are also valuable and because a very large BIG would have un-
desirable incentive effects, a small to modest BIG is preferable to a 
big BIG” (Garfinkel et allii ,2006, p.160)
This conclusion brings us to one of the most difficult is-
sues in the BIG debate. What is  a desirable and feasible level of a BIG? 
Can the introduction of BIG be financed and at what level should a BIG 
be pitched? There is no easy answer to the question of optimality and 
each region or territorial entity will have a different one. However, re-
sponses on that issue range from an outright rejection of BIG to very 
diverse proposals for its introduction.
 Those who reject the introduction of BIG are mostly close-
ly associated with the workings of social security systems in developed 
nations (Barbara Bergmann, 2006).  First , there is the argument given 
by Garfinkel. Other welfare programs and government functions as di-
verse as rural roads, primary schools, health insurance programs, hu-
man resource development, access of disabled persons to public spac-
es, adult education, child care centers for one parent families, etc. are 
all valuable to alleviate poverty and government intervention in some 
form of financing and regulation, will be necessary. Second, in most of 
the developed countries, means testing is feasible and is organized, so 
why spend money on the rich or those who do not need  a basic income 
. The extra money that would be delivered to everyone in a BIG system 
, can better be used for the urgent needs of those in need for special 
treatments. In Bergmann’s words
“Both the welfare state and Basic Income reduce inequality of condi-
tion. But the welfare state does so with greater efficiency, because it 16 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-03 South Africa’s BIG debate in comparative perspective
takes better account of inequalities due to differences in needs. If I 
need an expensive operation and you don’t, giving us a Basic Income 
grant will not go far to make our situations more equal. Only the pro-
vision of health services has the chance of doing so”
She adds however some interesting remarks to her con-
clusions. First , her priority is for the provision of public or merit goods 
in countries such as the US (and South Africa?), introduction of BIG 
is not a good substitute for health and other service delivery . Sec-
ond when sufficient provision for merit goods is guaranteed and “ if 
through time the capital intensity of production and productivity rise , 
then as a result  the demand for labor may shrink…(then) basic income 
grants may be the best way of distributing an increasing share of the 
national income” (Bergmann, 2006:141)
Exactly the last part of Bergmanns’ argument (the rising 
labor productivity and capital intensity due to more competition in 
the global markets) , has been the rationale for  BIEN to insist on the 
increasing feasibility of financing the BIG. Indeed globalization and 
openness of markets will increase the drive for capital intensity and 
productivity rises, thereby increasing the problem of production and 
income increases that do not accrue to labour, therefore taxation (and 
financing of BIG or social security) must be disconnected from labor 
and wage labor. Otherwise the financial base will shrink and endanger 
the social security system. In this sense the BIG, introduction in the 
21st century  is as (r)evolutionary as Keynes’ solution to Marx’ prob-
lem of  under-consumption. Keynes solution was to create purchas-
ing power through the introduction of contra-cyclical state  spending 
through the welfare state. However the financing of the social security 
part of the welfare state was  based on taxation of labour (the differ-
ence between gross and net wages). In other words the ratio of ac-
tive versus non-active population has and will further decrease . Since 
social security outlays are mostly transfers from active to non active 
population, the difference between the financial cost of introducing a 
BIG , where all members of society receive a BIG, and the traditional 
social security system, where only non-active receive social assistance 
grants, will decrease.
Most of the debate on BIG versus means tested condi-
tional security systems have been discussed within the context of the 
high income countries. Much less consideration has been paid to the 
merits and pitfalls of both systems in low and middle income coun-
tries. In the next section we take the example of South Africa as a mid-
dle income country that has already  means tested conditional grants 
in the areas of old age pensions, child and disabled income support. Is 
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	 3.	 the	soCIAl	seCurIty	And	the	bIG	debAte	In	sA
   3.1.  Inequality in the  post-apartheid era: from race to  
      class divide?
Although comparing inequality in time and space is often 
extremely shaky because of the quality of data, many authors would 
agree that South Africa has , with a Gini coefficient of 0.7,  one of the 
highest degrees of inequality in the world . (Fedderke et al, 2003)
We only have reliable South African data for the post-
apartheid period up to 2000 because the Income and Expenditure Sur-
vey for 2005 has not yet been published . There is however enough 
reason to assume that the trend depicted in the household income and 
expenditure data up to 2000 have not been reversed. But first the data 
on the evolution of inequality. The Lorenz curve and concomitant Gini 
coefficients ( figure 3) point to an increasing inequality in post-apart-
heid South Africa. 
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 When we decompose the inequality coefficients and apply them 
to the different racial groups we can see a remarkable shift in the 
composition of inequality in the post-apartheid era. Table 1 gives the 
gini-coefficients of household income distribution in the different 
racial groups from 1975-1995 to 2000.1 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-03 South Africa’s BIG debate in comparative perspective
Table I: Racial Income distribution ( gini-coefficents), 1975-2000 
1975* 1995* 2000*
African 0.47 0.56 0.61
White 0.36 0.44 0.46
Coloured 0.51 0.50 0.55
Asian 0.45 0.47 0.50
Total 0.68 0.65 0.70
 *The 1975 figures are Census data from Whiteford and Van Seventer (2000) , whereas the 1995 and 
2000  are Income and Expenditure Survey (IES)data
Source: based on Seekings et al., 2004 :p.7
From this table there is a remarkable shift in inequality 
composition. It is the inequality within the group of Africans that has 
risen most dramatically with the group of whites in the second place. 
Because the Africans were previously to be found predominantly in the 
poor population it means that in that group upward mobility was high-
est. The inverse is true for the White group, since their 1975 income 
position was  in the highest income bracket , an increase in their gini-
coefficient means that   more white families end up in lower income 
deciles. However as shown in table 2 ., the highest income decile is still 
very much “white coloured” with the African group coming from the 
last position in income and wealth ranking to the second place. The 
other groups have however also improved their share in the highest 
income decile, in this sense, for the higher income groups, post-apart-
heid was more of a rainbow nation.







White 95 73 61
African 2 18 25
Coloured 2 4 9
Asian 1 5 5
Total 100 100 100
*The 1975 figures are Census data from Whiteford and Van Seventer (2000) , whereas the 1995 and 
2000  are Income and Expenditure Survey (IES)data and per capita income deciles
Source: based on Seekings et al., 2004 :p.6
In fact the winners in the income distribution  are most-
ly formal income earners with skilled personnel making the highest 
move. Real wages and salaries in the formal sector have gone up with 
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earnings have risen only with 7%. (Cichello et al: ,2001: 130). In the 
highest income bracket  we find white collar/high educated workers 
in the private sector at the top. Since the access to these  jobs depend 
on the number of years of higher education and educational achieve-
ment we have here one of the strongest factors in the reproduction of 
wealth and poverty (Anderson et al;, 2001). Poor African households 
cannot afford many and good quality years of schooling , consequently 
you will find them less in the highest rewarded jobs. This category is 
closely followed by high rank government officials where participation 
of whites is decreasing and African officials are taking over. The up-
ward mobility of the African group , with the exception of high ranking 
officials and some in the private sector because of merit and BEE, will 
be overwhelmingly found in the middle income classes : The skilled 
workers and those with intermediate years of training and education.
At the other end of  the income distribution , in the two 
lowest income deciles - the destitute in the language of the World 
Bank -  we find predominantly black households with more than 90 % 
of the poor population (Taylor commission, 2002:15).
In less statistical terms and more sociological categories, 
the poor are overwhelmingly those that are unemployed or lost their 
jobs. The link between poverty and unemployment is crystal clear. Be-
tween 1999 and 2002 the unemployed increased by   2 million peo-
ple and those in poverty by an estimated 4 million in the same period 
(Meth &Dias, 2003:7-9). The Taylor commission reported that 38% of 
all South Africans’ households were ’workerless’,  that 22% reported 
being hungry and that 45-55% of the households , depending on the 
definition of the poverty line, fell below the poverty line (Taylor com-
mission, 2002: 28-29)
The evolution and participation in the labour market is 
thus central for concerns of poverty, but a univocal evolution of over-
all employment is not available. This is due to the normal difficulties 
of defining who is unemployed and especially the problem of meas-
uring the informal sector and defining there who can be counted as 
employed. The most reliable statistics on employment in the formal 
(non-agricultural) sector is the south African Reserve Bank , based 
on reporting by the firms themselves. Employment measured in full 
time equivalents has decreased in 2003 to 80% of its volume in 1990 
(Seekings, 2004:15). However if we follow Simkins (2003) and Rodrik 
(2006:8-12) total employment in the formal sector has remained con-
stant or increased in the period 1997-2003 from 8.6 million employed 
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Another source based on the Labour Force Surveys and 
data from the SA Reserve Bank point at a substantial increase in for-
mal employment during the latter years from 5.2 million in 2000 to 7.9 
million in 2005 (IMF,2006). If this is correct, then unemployment has 
decreased in the latter years. 
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Whatever the exact evolution of employment due to dif-
ferent time-frames and definitions, maybe a few tendencies are clear 
and worrisome. First, unemployment still hovers in its very strict defi-
nition2 around 27 % and in its expanded version around 37 % of the 
total labour force. Second there are the shifts that occurred structur-
ally in the labour force composition. We have seen the rise of formal 
employment in services (insurance, banking, trade, retail , tourism 
etc) but a steady decline in mining, agriculture and especially manu-
facturing. It is these sectors, that traditionally used a lot of low-skilled 
personnel , where these vulnerable workers categories have been laid 
off.  The shift from low-skilled to high skilled demand of labour has of 
course accentuated the tendency towards more inequality and more 
poverty.
The last factor that clears the ground for  understanding 
poverty and the role of social assistance is the minor importance of 
the informal sector in South Africa to dampen the negative effects of 
(near)jobless growth. The informal sector in South Africa accounts for 
an estimated 20 % of employment whereas it is as high as 75 % on 
average in other Sub Saharan African countries (Simkins, 2003: figure 
4 Rodrik, 2006:39). So the fall back on informal activities for unem-
ployed is limited in South Africa due to a number of factors. Strict la-
bour regulations for small businesses, legacy of apartheid with fara-
way markets, crime environment , etc. are all factors that are invoked 
to explain the relative small informal sector in South Africa. 
2 The  difference  between  the  strict  and  the  ex-
panded definition of unemployment resides in the 
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In sum, although there is a high degree of uncertainty on 
the exact amount of employment and unemployment, there are a few 
certainties that set the scene for the discussion on social security and 
a possible introduction of BIG. Most probably the real unemployment, 
even if we take into account the improvement in latter years, still hov-
ers around 35 to 40 % of the active population. Taking into account 
an active population (between 19-64 years) of 29 million inhabitants 
and at maximum 10 million with a job (some 8-9 million in the formal 
economy and some 1.5 to 2 million in the informal sector), this is cer-
tainly not an exaggeration. The global picture of  South Africa in terms 
of social divide  is best summed up  by the image given by Seekings 
(2004:37)
















Source: Adapted from Seekings (2003b: 2).
   3.2.  Social security and poverty in SA
The literature on poverty has boomed in the last decade 
and world leaders put the issue of poverty on the international agenda. 
The Millennium Development Goal (MDG) on reducing world poverty 
by half in 2015 is perhaps the best known.  With the work of Sen (1984, 
1999) and his influence at the level of the Human Development Report , 
there is a widespread consensus that income poverty is but one aspect 
of the dynamics of poverty and that social exclusion is a complex and 
difficult vicious circle to break. It needs simultaneous and synergetic 
efforts by governments, civil society, international donors and the 
pressure of the poor themselves. More and better access to education, 
health services, safe water, electricity, more government budget; mo-
tivated schoolmasters, nurses, doctors, civil servants … are all part 
of one of the world’s biggest challenges. It is not sure that there is 
enough real willingness to go beyond the lip service and the efforts 
that are already engaged in the struggle against poverty. If therefore 
income poverty is but one of the aspects of poverty it is nevertheless 
a synthetic index for  deprivation in general and it is a powerful tool to 
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policy has to know who is poor and how many people are poor so in-
evitably every discussion has to start with defining some sort of pov-
erty line under which people should not fall if social justice is a serious 
matter.
The  classic  distinction  within  the  poverty  literature  is 
between an absolute and a relative poverty line. An absolute level 
of income poverty is defined in terms of a basket of basic goods and 
services such as food, water, shelter etc. Because prices of these basic 
necessities can differ from place to place even within  the same coun-
try an absolute poverty line has to be country and region specific. In 
South Africa the Household Subsistence Level Surveys (EPRI 2004:17-
19) has defined such poverty lines for more than 24 major urban cen-
tres. This line varies from 1274 to 1456 Rand per month for a family of 
five (2 adults-3 children) in 2000. An updated average poverty line for 
2007 can approximately be estimated at R.18203 or a R.364 on a per 
capita basis.4 The IMF estimates the number of poor in South Africa,  
those living below the poverty line  of $ 25   , at 34 % of the population 
(IMF 2006:34)
A relative poverty line starts from the implicit idea that 
poverty is defined in relative terms and one can be considered poor 
only in the context of a given time and place. People do compare their 
situation relative to other members of the society. It is thus in relation 
to a general level of standard of living that the poor are defined.  In Eu-
rope the relative poverty line is set at 60% of the average income level 
(Cantillon); The World Bank defines as poor the people within the low-
est 40% of income. The destitute are defined as the poorest 20% of 
the population. In South Africa, the poverty line under which 40% of 
the households fall is estimated at R 459 per person/month or 597 in 
20076 (my calculation). The destitution level or the level under which 
20 % of the population would fall in 2000 was a R. 100 , hence the 
proposal for a BIG of R.100. Adjusting for inflation would mean pitch-
ing the BIG today at a R.130 per person/month.  A major drawback of a 
relative poverty line I of course that with such a definition poverty will 
never be eradicated, therefore a combination with an absolute level of 
poverty is necessary.
The South African government has done quite a lot in the 
area of social security and investment in the social sectors such as 
education and health. As can be deducted from figure 5 the state dedi-
cates increasing amounts in absolute and relative terms of the budget 
to these social sectors. 
3 My estimation on the basis of IMF country re-
port data (2006)
4 If one is to take into account the absolute line 
for children then we arrive at R.182 and R 728 for 
adults. 
5 measured at purchasing power parity (PPP)  
 6For 2000figures (EPRI, 2000:22) for 2007 my 
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Figure 6: social expenditure as a share of total expenditure 1999-2006
98/99
Source: National Treasury and IMF
Expenditures (percent of GDP)
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Overall  the  education  ,  health  and  social  transfers  ac-
count for more than half of total government expenditure and their 
share is increasing to more than 56 % of total government spending 
. These are the highest outlays per inhabitant for the whole of Sub Sa-
hara Africa.
Within the social spending categories it is the social trans-
fers that are increasing fastest. The announced  increase  in the Child 
Support grant to R.190 per month is certainly going to expand further 
the share of social spending within the government budget. The three 
main domains of social assistance and vertical income redistribution 
are the Child Support Grant (CSG), the State Old Age Pension grant  
(SOAP) and the disability grant (DG). In the latest Annual Report of 
the Social Development Department – the ministry responsible for the 
execution of the social assistance grants , we find the following actual 
spending and beneficiaries of the different social grants
Table 4:  Social assistance grant categories and spending in 2006 
Number of beneficiaries 
(‘000)
Amount of the grant in 
R/month
Budget in mio Rand
SOAP    2131 890 22764
CSG    6961 190 15864
DG    1312 890 14016
Total*   10800 52644**
* the total is not the sum of the three categories as there are other smaal categories of beneficiaries 
and grants of minor importance such as the foster care grant the care dependency grant and the war 
veterans grant
**The grants here are those used in 2006-2007 and do not correspond with the ones the administra-
tion used during the whole of the budget year 2005-2006; the total budget spent is an estimation and 
is in fact an oversestimation of the actual spent budget
Source: calculations based on data from Republic of South Africa, Annual Report of the Department 
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All of these grants are means tested and thus conditional , 
the cost of delivery is counted as 6% of the total budget. It is clear that 
the impact of  the  social security system in SA has a major impact on 
poverty alleviation. 
The impact of the social security system on poverty alle-
viation has been assessed in two major studies. One has been pub-
lished as a result of the Taylor commission titled “Transforming the 
Present – Protecting the Future : Consolidated Report” (2002). The 
second was published two years later , again commissioned by the So-
cial Development Department of the Government . This detailed study 
was executed  by the Economic Policy Research Institute (EPRI 2004)   
and is  a comprehensive simulation study of different possible reforms 
of SA’s social security system on poverty. Both major studies found  
that the existing system has a positive impact on poverty alleviation. 
The Taylor commission found that the existing system decreased the 
poverty gap7 by 23 % (Taylor:2002:61) and if all eligible people would 
actually take up the grant then the the poverty gap would be reduced 
by 37% and eight hundred thousand additional people would be freed 
from poverty. The positive impact is exemplified in the following figure 
7. Four situations are depicted; Figure 7.1; shows the SA case without 
social assistance, Figure 7.2 Poverty reduction with actual social as-
sistance, 7.3. The poverty impact if there were a full take up of all ex-
isting grants and finally 7.4. the impact if BIG or a major reform would 
be initiated.










                       
7 The  poverty  gap  for  one  person  is  the  differ-
ence between the poverty line and the effective 
(lower) income of a poor person. If we sum all 
these  amounts  of  income  of  people  below  the 
poverty line , we obtain the absolute poverty gap 
expressed in Rand , dollar or whatever currency. 
The  average  poverty  gap  divides  this  absolute 
poverty gap by the number of people under the 
poverty line and compares it to the poverty line. 
If  however  you  divide  that  amount  of  average 
poverty gap by the poverty you obtain the poverty 
gap expressed in a %.
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Source: drawings and updated data based on Taylor(2002) , EPRI(2004) and Republic of SA (2006)
The EPRI study made more detailed simulations of impact for the dif-
ferent grants and found that:
The greatest reducing potential lies with the progressive extension of 
the Child Support Grant. Extending the eligibility age to 14 reduces 
the poverty gap by 16.6 %, and a further extension to age 18 reduces 
the poverty gap by 21.4%. Increasing the real grant payment gener-
ates an even greater impact…combining the higher CSG extended to 
age 14 with the full take-up of the SOAP and the DG yields a reduc-
tion in the total rand poverty gap of 29%...South Africa’s system of 
social security substantially reduces deprivation, and the progressive 
extension of the magnitude, scope and reach of social grants holds 
the potential to dramatically diminish the prevalence of poverty in 
South Africa” (EPRI 2004:52-54)  
I have extensively quoted from this study and its conclusion because 
this is exactly what the government has done in 2007  (see president 
Mbeki’s -State of the Union ). It has therefore chosen to change the 
system at the margin , try to improve it and go against the plea for 
the introduction of a BIG, recommended by the Taylor commission and 
defended by COSATU . Before going into a comparison of the merits 
and drawbacks  of this particular choice and the introduction of a BIG 
we’ll first try to understand the political debate and the ‘passions and 
interests’ that fed this debate. 
3.3. The BIG debate in SA political arenas
Thirteen years after its coming to power, the three con-
stituents of the Triple Alliance, the ANC, the SACP and COSATU have 
retained a strong emancipatory rhetorics and remain committed to so-
cial security interventions to counter the social legacies of the apart-
heid era. However, fierce debates have been and continue to be waged 












25.7%26 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-03 South Africa’s BIG debate in comparative perspective
over the direction this social spending should take, both within and 
without the Triple alliance. The disputes over strategies against pov-
erty seem to parallel cleavages that, with the Mbeki presidency well 
into its second term, become more and more apparent but the roots of 
which can be traced back far into the 1990s.
The  ambitious  neo-Keynesian  Reconstruction  and  De-
velopment Programme was soon traded for the Growth, Employment 
And Redistribution programme (GEAR), that is commonly described 
and decried as a neo-liberal turn. This has provoked, as we will see, 
widespread protest and resentment, not the least on the side of the 
SACP and COSATU who, by the turn of the century managed to incline 
government politics slightly back to a developmental agenda. While 
it is asserted that the heyday of neo-liberal policies in South Africa is 
over, this shift in policy is held responsible for the limited advances 
that have been made in improving the majority’s living conditions.
In the same period, dismayed communities have taken to 
the street to express their expectations from local and national gov-
ernment. The last years have seen an upsurge in localised “uprisings”. 
Throughout 2005, on average 3 “unprocedural” demonstrations oc-
curred every day.8 These often violent actions are aimed against local 
policy measures that are perceived as injustice, or to express concern 
over lacking service delivery (or corruption). These protest actions 
often take the form of marches on governmental infrastructure, of 
toyi-toyis or of more menacing and violent expressions of discontent. 
Simultaneously, South African civil society seems to recover from the 
disarray that characterised the aftermath of attaining its premium 
goals in 1994 and a new generation of social movements, initially in re-
action to the adoption of GEAR, have seen the light.9 The World Sum-
mit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002 marked the 
existence of these movements on the map of South African civil society, 
and in a way seems to have been the acme of their organised existence. 
These movements address issues such as HIV/AIDS, insecurity and 
foremost: poverty. A very oft-heard resentment among both sponta-
neous and structured protest groupings, is that the ANC has turned 
away from its progressive promises of the apartheid era, and has now 
turned into a “footloose” party that no longer concerns itself with the 
demands of the poor.
The government's general attitude to these movements 
has been to incriminate them, rather than taking their political mes-
sages  serious.  Thabo  Mbeki  outrightly  amalgamated  spontaneous 
protest movements with crime in the June 2006 budget speech. The 
putting together of political violence and crime seemed instrumental 
in condemning all kinds of protest outside the large traditional organi-
sations of South Africa's political life. After warning that law enforce-
ment agencies would step up their action against those who drag the 
country “back to the killing fields that marked the dying days of apartheid”, 
8“According to the minister of safety and security, 
Charles  Nqakula,  quoted  in  one  of  the  Sunday 
newspapers, there were some 5000 legal demon-
strations across the country in 2005 and almost 
a thousand unprocedural ones. Protest action is 
reportedly  approaching  levels  last  seen  before 
the establishment of democracy.” (Ntshalintshali, 
2006)
9 For a broad treatment of several of these new 
social movements, see the contributions in Bal-
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he urged these “organised political, social and other formations to act with 
similar vigour to defeat the negative forces that believe that the liberation, 
for which many sacrificed their lives, gives them freedom to act in a manner 
that fundamentally negates the very meaning of our emancipation” (Quin-
tal 2006). These remarks, that skilfully blend reassessments of the 
struggle for liberation to the condemnation of those who nowadays 
confront the government's flaws are exemplary for the ANC's unease 
when dealing with opposition.
However, this “master discourse” that emanates mostly 
from the mainstream, presidential current of the ANC, is contested 
within the Tripartite Alliance itself, where  attempts at concentrating 
power in the presidency are seen with bigger and bigger concern. From 
May 2006 onward, this debate has been lifted onto a more critical lev-
el, foremost by the SACP. The May (special) issue of the SACP’s Central 
Committee's information bulletin released a “discussion document” 
questioning the nature of the South African transition, and the roles 
the Tripartite Alliance and the SACP within or without the alliance 
should play (CC SACP, 2006). Shortly after the SACP, COSATU equally 
attacked the “dictatorial leadership style” of president Mbeki and the 
unsatisfactory “left” achievements of the government.
SACP and COSATU criticise the growth-oriented develop-
ment path the ANC has been pushing and the “elite-oriented” Black 
Economic Empowerment policy.  This axis within the alliance on the 
contrary advocates “measures toward the construction of socialism”, 
such as the replacing of BEE as it is now by mass-empowering meas-
ures. Although the concern that they mostly defend the interests of 
organised labour has been raised, their more populist-left stances on 
the reproduction of labour and the second economy seem to resonate 
with the social undercurrents and movements we have spoken about. 
Their common criticism that the ANC is alienating its movement-base 
to the benefit of a managerial centre where government power is con-
centrated, and their insistence on its abandonment of the progressive 
promises of the Freedom Charter and other apartheid-era-documents 
tap into a widespread consensus. Moreover, COSATU has been active-
ly involved in civil society protests that opposed to the government's 
economic policies, such as the Social Movements Indaba, the People's 
Budget Campaign and the BIG-coalition to which we will return later.
The ANC itself has indeed been implementing a growth-
oriented policy which is however complemented with an extended 
(and appreciated) public works-programme. Moreover, as we said at 
the beginning of this paragraph, the ANC remains strongly committed 
to a social security net that insures all South African citizens against 
unfortunate twists of fate. However, as can be read from the general 
statements the party has made on the second economy and from the 
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been published in preparation for the 2007 General Conference, the 
ANC has clearly embraced the market as the means to fight poverty. 
This results in a discourse in which the second economy is regarded as 
a “backward” section of the economy, which has to catch up with the 
“first”, normal economy. The organic link between the two, the produc-
tion of a relative surplus-population as a result of the dynamics of this 
capitalist economy, is not grasped.10 Similarly, the market-economy 
that the ANC seeks to establish is implicitly supposed to provide work 
and a living wage for all. As a consequence, unemployment insurance 
is dealt with as a means to protect workers who happen to end up in 
an unfortunate, but generally avoidable and certainly anomalous situ-
ation.
In a remarkable 2006 Centre for Social Science Research 
Working Paper on South African social security options, Jeremy Seek-
ings  has  pitted  the  political  approaches  to  “welfare  or  workfare” 
against one another (Seekings 2006). The argument he lays out is con-
comittant with ours, in that he ascribes an ideological undercurrent to 
the ANC which shuns away from granting money to ‘idle-goers’ and fa-
vours an earned, albeit through the different PWPs, income. However, 
this latter preference of work over grants is convincingly argued to be 
overambitious, as the government has proved uncapable of engineer-
ing PWPs of a scope that matches the needs (Seekings, 2006).
These positions of the ANC and the alliance partners alike, 
replicate themselves in the debate on the BIG. As said, the ANC does 
not take up the suggestions of the Taylor Commission and rejects the 
BIG following an EPRI report. In fact, the ANC does not even support 
a discussion in which the BIG is taken up as a valid policy option. “Stel-
lenbosch conference mandated us to discuss the Basic Income Grant. It may 
be helpful to discuss the comprehensive social security net that include [sic] 
retirement benefits, social grants, free education and health care, house-
hold support, food security and a range of co-ordinated and focused benefits 
against basic income grants which would neither have the broad or deep 
impact on poverty eradication nor the broad mobilisation of resources to 
address diverse aspects of poverty and well-being of our people.” (ANC, 
2007, § 12, our emphasis) This outtake from the abovementioned dis-
cussion document on Social Transformation clearly steers the discus-
sion away from a BIG (in its uncomplemented version) by implicitly 
hinting at the PWPs that would be a more “active” (“mobilisation” ) way 
to counter poverty. This is in line with the ethos to which, according 
to Seekings, is stubbornly clung and which would emanate from the 
fear to create a dependent class of citizens. “Our attack on poverty must 
seek to empower people to take themelves out of poverty, while creating 
adequate social nets to protect the most vulnerable in our society.” (ibid, 
§10) Simultaneously the ANC’s continues to stress its disposition to 
expand the existing grant system.
Consequently, the ANC pledges to give considerable additional fund-
10 Cfr. the SACP’s criticism: “The present hegem-
onic state project conceptualises this terrain as 
the “second economy”, and although the word 
“underdevelopment”  is  invoked,  it  is  not  really 
understood as the dialectical consequence of the 
current  “development”  path  of  capitalist  accu-
mulation. The so-called “second economy” is, in 
effect, understood as undeveloped – i.e. as a “left-
over” from the apartheid past that requires mod-
ernisation and “promotion” into the “first econo-
my” – the metaphor of a “stairway” is sometimes 
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ing to the SOAP, as in the latest State of the Nation and Budget speech, 
and make a plea to strengthen the UIF. This tendency to enlarge the 
existing system, rather than pleading for a radical overhaul, contrasts 
strongly with the positions of both the Alliance partners and the op-
position.
The  DA  has  repeatedly  opposed  its  commitment  to  a 
BIG to the ANC’s budget speeches. The party argues that “[t]he Basic 
Income Grant is not welfarist in character. At a humble R110 a month the 
programme will neither keep young able-bodied workers out of the labour 
market nor will it overly burden the fiscus. [...] Because the Basic Income 
Grant is not conditional on whether or not one works it also acts as an in-
direct form of  wage support, with the result being an increase in employ-
ment which is more pronounced for less skilled or low-income workers.” (DA 
2006) By stating this, it goes radically against the fear of the ANC (and 
most probably taps into the research presented above). Moreover, by 
presenting the BIG as a form of wage-support, their proposition im-
plicitly avoids the costly administrative needs that would come with 
the ANC’s initiatives in this realm (see ANC, 2007). However, the DA’s 
proposal is a means- tested BIG, as only those earning less than R 
7500 could benefit from it. This clearly diminishes the appeal of the 
administratively lean BIG.
Compared to this, the ANC’s alliance partner COSATU is 
more unequivocal in its support for the BIG (the SACP is aligned on 
these positions, but far less vocal on the issue). They reacted to the 
much-debated 2007 State of the Nation by Thabo Mbeki, in which the 
enlargement of the Old Age Pension was envisaged, by stating that 
“We have in principle supported the introduction of retirement savings 
but we believe that the devil is going to be in the detail.” (COSATU, 
2007) After expressing their fear that the cost of retirement savings 
would disproportionally fall on the workers and the poor, their plea for 
the introduction of a BIG as the only meaningful intervention to allevi-
ate poverty is reiterated. “COSATU will continue to campaign for the 
introduction of the Basic Income Grant and hope that the ANC, which 
in its congress called for an open debate on this, will finally honour its 
mandate and engage its alliance partners on this important question.” 
Although this hope may well lead to utter disappointment, it is very 
important to note that COSATU is indeed actively involved in both the 
People’s Budget Campaign and the BIGCoalition, the two main civil 
society organisations that have spearheaded the struggle for the in-
troduction of a BIG.
COSATU, contrary to the ANC as we have seen, follows 
the Taylor commission on this topic. They plead for the introducion of 
a Basic Income Grant to counter the current shortcomings of the social 
security net. Moreover, COSATU links the introduction of this measure 
clearly to the situation on the South African labour market. First of all, 
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employment. Moreover, with FEDASU and SACTU, they distrust the 
current BEE-measures, stating that “They seem directed simply at the 
enrichment of a few individuals, and often is simply a front for the sta-
tus quo.” (COSATU, FEDASU & SACTU, 2006, p 15). In the same doc-
ument, COSATU champions the BIG for a much more down-to-earth 
reason than its overal poverty-reducing effects: unemployment is it-
self not only discouraging people from looking for a job, it also deprives 
them of the means to get one (transport in the first place). Although 
being historically opposed to VAT, COSATU seems to accept the idea of 
a tiered VAT-system that would finance the BIG.
This can be read from the publications of the People’s 
budget campaign (PBC), an NGO / campaign opposing the official 
budget with an alternative that emanates from civil society. The PBC 
consists of COSATU, South African Council of Churches and South Afri-
can NGO coalition (SANGOCO), thus grouping the lion’s share of South 
Africa’s progressive civil society organisations. The same umbrella or-
ganisations find themselves grouped in the BIGCoalition – the name 
speaks for itself – but this latter group’s activities seem to have with-
ered in the last years. In any case, the arguments of both movements 
are similar to the ones already mentioned. A BIG is promoted as the 
most effective and considerable means to alleviate poverty and as a 
means to guarantee solidarity (through the tax system) among South 
Africans. Thus, the proposal rings with older populist, even socialist 
proposals that were championed during the days of the anti-apartheid 
movement.
	 4.	 more	workfAre,	welfAre	or	mArGInAl	ChAnGes		
	 	 	 to	the	stAtus	quo?
   4.1.  The shortcomings of the existing system
South Africa is probably the middle income country with 
the most comprehensive system of social protection in both its social 
assistance policy (welfare) and public works program (workfare). With 
social spending (education, health and social grants expenditures) at 
55 % of total government expenditure, and with an expanding budget 
in absolute and relative terms for social grants, it is doing more than 
most Middle Income Countries. With its social grants it has alleviated 
income poverty and with its intervention in the health and education 
sectors it has helped to overcome what A.Sen has called capability 
poverty. 
Moreover other expenditure such as the right on a free 
minimum water supply or Public Works Programs (PWP),  included 
in the expenditure of other government departments, would even in-
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conceived as temporary anti poverty measures, realized a job creation 
of some 4 million work days a year, some 1% of the workdays needed to 
eliminate unemployment (Mc Cord, 2003). An expanded PWP in 2004 
aimed at creating some two hundred thousand short term job oppor-
tunities. Of course in comparison with the structural 9-11 active non 
employed population in mind, this is a very small mitigation of poverty 
and structural unemployment 
Without the shadow of a doubt, existing social safety nets 
in SA have reduced the number of poor and the poverty gap for those 
below the poverty line. However, population growth and the evolution 
op poor employment growth with a bias in favor of well-paid skilled 
workforce, has increased both inequality and overall poverty. The ex-
isting social safety net , however useful, was of a loose weave and in-
adequate to cope with the massive challenge of poverty. The four main 
shortcomings of the existing social assistance system are:
•  Two  very  substantial  vulnerable  population  groups  are  not  cov-
ered by the social safety net: The unemployed and the (illegal) im-
migrants. The IUF (unemployment allowance) for those who lose 
their formal employment expires after six months. It therefore is an 
insurance against frictional or cyclical unemployment but it is com-
pletely insufficient to address the structural unemployment of an 
estimated 40% of the working population. The internal migration 
, because of the deagrarianization and the other African immigra-
tion creates another vulnerable group and poverty challenge that 
is as yet not seriously addressed.  
•  The take up rates of the existing social grants are worrisome. Only 
the existing SOAP (state old age pension) has a take up rate of more 
than 80%. The child support grant however reaches only 15 to 25 
% of the children who are eligible for a grant. (Taylor commission 
2002:30 and EPRI, 2004:28) 
•  The poorest in society , those in the two lowest income deciles and 
most in need of social transfers, receive the lowest grants. In other 
words the means testing and the targeting of the poor is a very poor 
policy indeed.(Taylor Commission 2002: 25)
•  The third most important social grant is the disability grant (DG 
see table). Not only is the take-up rate very low (30% see EPRI, 
2004:29) but with the particular severe AIDS problem in South Af-
rica, the danger of  a moral hazard problem or an AIDS poverty trap 
is very real. Indeed , the government, in order to face the challenge, 
has introduced free antiretroviral (ARV) medication and a DG for 
the sick. However if the ARV treatment succeeds, one loses   the 
DG, and since unemployment is almost certainly lurking behind the 
corner for the unskilled and former AIDS patients, getting better is 
also losing the disability grant. (Nattrass, 2006- Van Parijs, 2007)32 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-03 South Africa’s BIG debate in comparative perspective
   4.2.  Is South Africa more BIG ripe than other countries?
In view of the shortcomings of the existing social assist-
ance system in South Africa, what is the better reform? Most high in-
come countries have  a mix of private insurance and a wide coverage 
of social assistance targeted at the different needs of the vulnerable 
population categories. There are important variations and differences 
between the various countries with  better coverage in the Scandina-
vian countries and other European Union countries and less in the USA 
and Great Britain.  In most of them some elements of Basic Income 
features can be found as in the case of child allowances that are often 
universal in scope and therefore non means tested. However with the 
exception of the state of Alaska, there is no country that has a nation-
wide BIG as the cornerstone of its social assistance system. In future, 
however, with an increasing share of non-active population and the 
pressures of globalization , the financial modalities of the existing 
system whereby the active pays for the non-active  come under stress. 
However , without major shocks , the existing system, with all its in-
conveniences mainly for the labor market in the form of  unemploy-
ment traps, is too well established as an institution to be overhauled 
drastically.
The case of some middle income countries such as South 
Africa, Brazil , Mexico, Argentina  has in contrast with low income 
countries on the one hand and the Asian middle income countries on 
the other , certain specific features that make them more a BIG candi-
date than the others. 
In low income countries , the national requirements for 
the constitution of a minimal state and a material infrastructure as 
precondition for growth limit severely the financial basis for the in-
troduction of a serious coverage of social assistance. There probably , 
PWP’s , social funds or cash for work programs are the more probable 
candidates to fit the constrained possibilities of the state. Although 
these workfare programs cannot address the massive poverty chal-
lenge, they still have other coping mechanisms that do not exist any-
more in these middle income countries. The deagrarianization has not 
been completed, the informal economy is more developed and the kin 
and clientilistic networks are still very active in coping with adversity 
(Hyden, 1984, De Herdt &Marysse, 1996). 
The middle income countries can be subdivided in two dis-
tinct categories. Those with strong labor unions, relatively high mini-
mum wages , collective bargaining mechanisms and where the dea-
grarianization process is completed. The other group, more located in 
Asia, has combined agrarian reforms and industrialization with unions 
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labor markets. These economies have been able to compete interna-
tionally also in international markets using low wages as a competi-
tive edge. Their combination with labour intensive agriculture keeping 
food prices low and states that compensated low wages at the firm 
level with higher social wages (housing, free education , worker allow-
ances etc) have been able to be successful internationally and yet keep 
poverty in check.(Hart, 2002) 
South Africa falls within the first group of middle income 
countries, because it has powerful unions, strict labor regulations , 
minimum wage policy that pitches the minimum wage relatively high. 
It has (therefore) within the context of the era of globalization , not 
unsuccessfully, chosen a path of growth that is relatively high skilled, 
capital intensive and as a consequence with poor employment growth 
(Rodrik, 2006). Combined with the completion of the deagrarianiza-
tion process through the establishment of a modern capital intensive 
and land extensive agriculture at the expense of disposessed rural 
populations, it has plunged many low skilled workers in structural 
unemployment and poverty. This combination of structural features 
makes these economies more BIG ripe than other candidates. Indeed 
in order to cope with the challenge of ensuing poverty it has three main 
alternatives where BIG seems to be the most rational choice.
Workfare  instead  of  welfare  and  social  grants  has  a 
prima facie preference because it links reward to effort and is in line 
with capitalist ethics or real citizenship that links rights to obligations. 
When people in surveys are asked whether one should have the right 
to a social transfer even if you do not deserve it because you have not 
looked for a job or was fired because drunk, most would answer no. So 
workfare certainly has more intuitive appeal than a basic income given 
without conditions. However, since unions in a context of relative high 
minimum wages cannot agree on the creation of ‘lower than minimum 
wage’ jobs, Public Works Programs (PWP) such as successfully imple-
mented in India and elsewhere, are not a solution to problems faced in 
countries like South Africa. The cost of putting 4 million people at work 
would equal the total cost of contemporary social transfers and would 
not address half of all unemployed in South Africa without counting 
the very poor that are generally not reached with these kinds of pro-
grams. Furthermore putting 4 million people at work , giving them on 
the job training and organizing these PWP’s  is more costly than paying 
grants. (Seekings, 2006 McCord, 2003)
So if workfare is not a serious alternative for social assist-
ance, two alternatives are left. Adapting and reforming the existing 
social assistance system or introducing  a BIG. Each of these alterna-
tives would certainly have a very positive impact on both reducing the 3 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-03 South Africa’s BIG debate in comparative perspective
poverty gap and the number of poor as exemplified in figure 6.4.. We 
have shown there that the introduction of a BIG could decrease the 
number of poor by eight million South Africans in comparison with the 
current situation. Pieter Leroux, in a remarkable article has argued 
convincingly that such an introduction of a BIG at the destitution level 
(R.100 in 2000 and R.130 today) is financially feasible  by increasing 
VAT rates by half (Leroux, 2006). So the debate should not be if BIG 
is feasible but if the other alternative of tightening the loose weave of 
the existing  social safety is better. 
The government has chosen to increase the eligible age 
of children to 14 years and has increased the means tested child sup-
port grant to R.190/month. This is a judicious choice . We know that 
the extension of  the CSG has a very positive impact not only on the 
income poverty but it also impacts positively on the capability poverty 
because it is invested in more schooling by the parents who receive the 
grant(EPRI, 2004). Moreover, in order to increase the take-up rates, 
the government has installed a new body in 2006 called South African 
Social Security Agency (SASSA) .Although  these are  positive steps , 
they do  not address the main shortcomings mentioned above. So fur-
ther reforms are necessary. The main drawbacks of  a further reform in 
that direction are threefold.
·  In contrast with high income countries , the weak state delivery ca-
pacity in middle income countries such as SA and testified by the 
very low take up of the social grants, will be compounded by the 
introduction of a new means tested grant to cope with the massive 
structural unemployment. 
·  The sheer size of the structural unemployment problem (at least 40 
% of the active population) minimizes the difference with an admin-
istratively less burdensome BIG. Indeed the higher the non-active 
population the lower the difference in financial burden between a 
targeted allowance or a universal allowance such as BIG. The fact 
that delivery costs for a universal allowance are lower, pleads in 
favor of a BIG. If the means tested allowance is pitched at the same 
level as a BIG, the financial burden for the BIG would remain higher, 
but administrative costs for delivery , since non means tested, are 
lower. Only if the government would be able to lower substantially 
the structural unemployment, is the argument for a means tested 
targeted unemployment allowance valid. Since the structural fea-
tures of the South African political economy will continue  to create 
large structural unemployment, the argument for a means tested 
allowance is weaker.
·  Even if such a means tested new unemployment allowance would 
be introduced , the problem of adverse selection stays. The poorest 
sections of the population do not access these grants, because they 
have no sufficient voice and capability to exercise these rights.
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	 5.	 ConClusIon	
Because of the structural features of 
certain middle income countries such as SA and 
because of their relative financial strength to sup-
port a comprehensive social safety net, the intro-
duction of  a BIG seems to be both feasible and 
effective to cope with income poverty, more than 
a  further  extension  of  means  tested  social  as-
sistance. In the particular situation of South Af-
rica however, opposing both systems seems to be 
counterproductive. The combination of continuing 
the stronger parts of the existing system  (SOAP, 
DG and the extension of the CSG) with a universal 
allocation such as a BIG pitched at the level of des-
titution would best serve the poor for a more dig-
nified life. Throughout this article, it has become 
clear that the active population is as yet not enti-
tled to any form of support or grant, be they unem-
ployed or not. Whereas the ANC seems to prefer 
mending this through strengthening the currently 
meager UIF, civil society and political parties alike 
are  demanding  a  BIG.  This  remarkable  support 
and the overall consensus to extend social security, 
present the leading parties with an almost unprec-
edented window of opportunity. Thus, should the 
ANC give up its contempt for the BIG, it would find 
in its introduction not only a feasible and effective 
social security measure, but equally a desired and 
popular political choice.
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